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The issue of ageing and saving has two distinct facets. On the one hand, there is
the individual issue. Each of us is getting older and wants to make sure that our
savings plans are appropriate. I term this the ‘microeconomic’ aspect of saving
and ageing. At the same time, OECD economies are themselves ageing: people
are living longer, the baby-boom generation, born after 1945, is passing through
to middle age and, in some countries, fertility rates are below replacement levels.
I term this the ‘macroeconomic’ aspect of ageing, and it will affect these
economies in almost all dimensions: in savings and investment rates, in the
growth rates of productivity, output and public spending, in wage structure,
educational attainment and labour supply (Disney, 1996). And, of course, there
are links between the microeconomic and macroeconomic facets of ageing: for
example, as a country ages, with more elderly dependants relative to workers, it
becomes harder to sustain the social security pension without higher taxes. In
turn, a prospective decline in the social security pension may cause people to
revise their individual or household saving and retirement strategies.
The growth of real incomes and wealth with age during the working life, and
the prospect of a private (occupational) pension on retirement, promise a
reasonably bright financial future for many people in a country such as Britain.
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Indeed, some studies of the United States suggest that many retirement
pensioners are already better off financially than when they were at work.
2
For others, however, the future may be less bright: in a relatively depressed
labour market where ‘skill requirements’ and employment structure are changing
rapidly, dismissal or redundancy in later life leads to poor re-employment
prospects.
3 Early job displacement therefore often leads to premature retirement
from the labour market, a reduced occupational pension and, in Britain at least,
the prospect of a state pension that is likely to be the least generous in Europe. In
the 1980s, inequality amongst pensioners has increased, even though the average
real income of pensioners has increased more rapidly than that of workers.
4
Even for the better-off, growing living standards may be associated with a
perception of greater insecurity in the future. Will there be a universal state
pension in the future? How much is my occupational pension really worth?
5If I
have invested in my house, or in a ‘money purchase’ pension scheme, or in
Lloyds, do I face a risk of capital loss? And should I buy health-care insurance
for late in life when I may require expensive hospital or residential care?
Paradoxically, as the ability to buy insurance against many of the consequences
of retirement (low incomes, the need for extra health care, etc.) has increased in
line with the growing sophistication of insurance products, people’s perception
of insecurity has increased, not least because recent policies, and the stance now
taken by both Conservative and Labour politicians, will increasingly shift
responsibility for these financial decisions onto individuals themselves.
6
It is not surprising that these microeconomic `insecurities’ of ageing coexist
with the macroeconomic trend in ageing described previously: as mentioned, one
obvious reason why countries have found it increasingly difficult to honour their
commitments to pay generous social security pensions is that there are far more
people over pensionable age to whom such pensions should be paid. Since social
security systems are rarely fully funded or ‘advance funded’ (that is, in practice,
current social security contributions pay current pensioners), then as the ‘aged
dependency ratio’ (the ratio of people of pensionable age to people of working
age) rises, so the capacity to pay social security pensions is diminished. And this
diminution in turn enhances the individual uncertainty attached to prospective
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incomes.
7 Nevertheless, it would be simplistic to ‘blame’ the social security
financing crises that are arising in several European countries on the ageing of
their population per se — commitments built up early in the lives of social
security systems have often proven unsustainable long before the ageing of the
population set in.
The distinction between the microeconomic and macroeconomic effects of
ageing, and the interrelation between these two facets, are issues that I want to
pursue here. I start in Section II with some cursory evidence as to the extent of
demographic ageing in some representative OECD countries, and then look in
Section III at the relationship across OECD economies between age structure on
the one hand and household savings rates and growth rates on the other. By a
heroic extrapolation, I want to `predict’ 30 years ahead to see what
macroeconomic performance might look like as the OECD population ages.
Being an economist, I also circumscribe the conclusions of this section with
numerous caveats and reservations. I then return, in Section IV, to questions of
individual behaviour and financial strategies in the context of an ageing
population: in particular, whether they are consistent with these broad
macroeconomic predictions. Inevitably, this evidence serves to complicate the
issue: a key factor may be the existence of precautionary saving in the face of
uncertainty associated with ageing. It is also important to look at actual
transactions between generations, such as bequests (inheritances).
II. SOME DEMOGRAPHIC ILLUSTRATIONS
The overall demographic story among OECD countries shows a universal ageing
of the population, with dramatic increases in the number of older people in some
countries. The most stark statistic is this: in the period 1975-95, there were
approximately four people aged 65 or over for every 10 aged 15 to 64 in the
population of OECD countries (the ratio, 0.4, is known as the demographic aged
dependency ratio). Projections to the year 2025 of the existing population show
that there will be eight people aged 65 or over for every 10 aged 15 to 64 by that
year in OECD countries — a doubling of the aged dependency ratio in 30 years
(United Nations, 1991).
Of course, in calculating overall population trends and the size of the future
labour force, estimates of future numbers of young people rely on projections of
fertility rates, but the numbers of middle-aged and elderly people should be
reasonably accurate in the absence of major life-threatening epidemics or
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unexpectedly dramatic mortality improvements. Thus the key relationships are
the total dependency ratio of those aged under 15 plus those aged 65 and over
relative to those aged 15 to 64 (a standard definition which ignores differences in
mandatory school-leaving ages across countries), and the aged dependency ratio
defined above. Note the obvious points that many people of ‘working age’ may
in fact be economically inactive, or sick or unemployed, whilst some of those
aged 65 and over may still be working. Furthermore, not all of those aged 65 and
over are entitled to a pension of their own. And, finally, note that trends over
time in participation in paid work may swamp demographic changes (for
example, in the UK, the rise in the labour-force participation of married women
since 1945, and the significant decline in labour-force participation of men aged
50 and above). A more pertinent ‘economic’ measure of dependency may be the
‘support ratio’ of the economically active to the economically inactive, as
defined, for example, by the number of contributors relative to pensioners in the
social security system of a country.
What is of most interest in the present context is the differential rate of
ageing of the population across OECD countries. The pie charts in Figure 1
illustrate the disparity in experiences of ageing across three countries, comparing
population shares in 1990 and, as projected by the United Nations, in 2025.
The UK exhibits a process of gradual ageing of the population, which has in
fact taken place since 1945. The next decade sees an abatement of this process,
but there is a jump in the aged dependency ratio when the post-war baby-boom
cohort start to retire after about 2010. The UK population is projected to rise
very slowly to the year 2025, by about 2 million, with an increase of over 25 per
cent in those aged 65 and over (i.e. by 7.2 percentage points from a 1990 base of
23.5 per cent). The absolute size of the potential work-force aged 15 to 64 is
almost constant. This pattern is not untypical of the northern European countries.
Italy offers an interesting contrast. Along with Denmark, it has one of the
lowest fertility rates in Europe, as well as a sizeable baby-boom cohort due to
retire. As a result, the population is actually projected to decline by the year
2025. The proportion aged 65 and over is projected to increase by almost 75 per
cent (i.e. by 14.9 percentage points from a base of 20.7 per cent). Italy has the
lowest participation rate of older workers among OECD economies (OECD,
1992). Note, too, that the Italian social security pension system had already gone
into substantial deficit by the early 1990s, well before the dramatic ageing of the
population set in, precipitating a series of economic and political crises which
have only partially resolved the problems of financing government spending.
Finally, Japan is an interesting economy: one of the major post-war economic
‘success’ stories but with a demographic history slightly different from the ‘baby
boom / bust’ of the European economies. It is also characterised by the highest
rate of labour-force participation of older workers among OECD countries, with
44 per cent of workers aged 55 and over participating in 1990 (OECD, 1992).
Even in Japan, however, the trend in labour-force participation among olderAgeing and Saving
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FIGURE 1
Demographic Trends in Selected Countries
Population Shares: UK, 1990
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workers since the mid-1960s has been downward, albeit participation among that
group had been largely stable from 1977 to 1990. The demographic trends in the
charts show that the population of young people is projected to fall dramatically
to the year 2025, while the number of people aged 65 and over rises by around
60 per cent between 1990 and 2025.
III. THE LIFE-CYCLE HYPOTHESIS OF SAVING
A natural context in which to think about the consequences of ageing for the
macroeconomy is the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) of saving established by
Franco Modigliani and his collaborators (Ando and Modigliani, 1963;
Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Modigliani, 1986). Assuming a well-
functioning capital market, the individual consumer or household will attempt to
smooth consumption expenditure over the lifetime, consuming more than income
(dissaving) in the early part of the working life when wages are relatively low
and when family formation and purchase of durables (notably housing
acquisition) take place, and saving in later middle age as housing loans are paid
off and children leave home. Assuming net wealth is maximised at retirement, no
bequest motive and a well-functioning annuity market (provision of pensions),
wealth is then reduced by dissaving to zero at the expected time of death.
8 A
stylised illustration of the wealth trajectory of a ‘representative’ household is
given in Figure 2.
9
How do demographic changes affect aggregate saving in this stylised version
of the LCH of saving? A straightforward prediction is that a country with a
higher aged dependency ratio will have a lower household savings rate, because
there will be more elderly dissavers and fewer people of working age who are,
on balance, net savers. There are, however, two caveats to this. First, if younger
people expect to live longer after retirement, they may increase their saving to
compensate for this expected longevity. This increased saving may offset the
reduction in aggregate saving arising from the greater number of elderly people.
Second, if each newer generation expects to have higher lifetime incomes, their
                                                                                                                                   
8 Clearly, if there is a strong bequest motive, assets will not be fully decumulated. This is discussed further
below. Under certain assumptions concerning the utility function, and a perfect capital market, the individual
will invest all his or her savings in annuities (Yaari, 1965). However, if there is a precautionary motive for
saving, the mix of annuitised and financial wealth will change over the life cycle (Carroll and Samwick, 1993;
Engen, 1993). An imperfectly-functioning annuity market will also affect precautionary saving (Davies, 1981).
9 In both Italy and Japan, it is argued that the life-cycle timing of saving for house purchase is very different
from the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model. For example, if, as in Italy, parents undertake house purchase for their children,
the extent of net wealth accumulation in Figure 2 will be reduced. In countries such as Japan where greater
saving for house purchase is required, the wealth trajectory may not even be single-peaked. But these points
should not detract from the general relationship between household saving and aged dependency put forward in
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FIGURE 2
Asset Accumulation over the Life Cycle
absolute saving may increase (once they reach the point of becoming net savers)
so that aggregate saving also rises. These effects may offset, but should not
eliminate, the predicted negative relationship between net saving and the aged
dependency ratio.
Figure 3 provides a simple scattergram of net household savings rates
averaged across 1977-92 for the 19 OECD countries that provide such data,
against their average aged dependency ratios (ADRs) over the period 1975-95.
Although there is a high degree of variation, it is apparent that there is a crude
negative relationship between the two, as the stylised theory would predict.
Running a simple bivariate regression between the two variables, a linear
relationship is obtained, which is plotted on the chart. Doubling the ADR, say
from 0.3 to 0.6, is associated with a reduction in the savings rate of about a third.
The ‘high’ and ‘low’ savers among countries should be read off the chart
controlling for their ADR. So Japan, Italy (averaged over the period) and even
the UK save more, given their ratio. Conversely, the US, the Netherlands and the
Scandinavian countries save less.
10
                                                                                                                                   
10 There are, of course, a number of methods of measuring the savings rate. Countries where a high degree of
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lower household savings rates. In countries where pensions are largely provided from state-run Pay-As-You-Go


























Household Savings Rate and Aged Dependency Ration:
19 OECD Countries, 1977-92
Now consider the following extrapolative experiment. Suppose that we have
identified the correct, time-invariant, relationship between the variables and that
the relation of each individual country to the underlying relationship (the ‘fixed
effect’) is also time invariant. Now project what the household savings rates
would be in the year 2025, given the respective ADRs of the various countries,
which have aged to differing degrees. These are plotted in Figure 4. There are
some interesting comparisons to be made with the earlier chart for 1977-92.
First, note the change in the axes: the doubling of the aged dependency ratio and
the reduction in general savings rates associated with the extrapolation of the
ADR-savings relationship. Second, note that the ordering of countries’ savings
rates has changed. An interesting comparison is that of Japan and the UK; as
Japan’s ADR has overtaken that of the UK, the gap between the corresponding
savings rates has narrowed; indeed, the extrapolation predicts that the UK will
have a higher household savings rate than Japan in 2025.
11 Ireland, too, given its
distinct demographic trend, changes its position in the ordering.
As can be seen from ‘eyeballing’ the chart, a simple bivariate cross-country
regression of this kind is not very robust: indeed, the coefficient on the aged
dependency ratio in the regression is not significant at the 5 per cent level and is
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Household Savings Rate and Aged Dependency Ration: 19 OECD Countries, 2025
not necessarily different from zero. This does not refute the general observation,
because a robust relationship between the two variables can be obtained in a
multivariate panel model. Studies by Weil (1994) and Disney (1996) both show a
strong relationship between savings rates and aged dependency ratios. Weil
examines nine OECD countries over the period 1960-85 using centred five-year
averages (since the demographic data change only slowly). He regresses private
savings (national, net of government) and household savings on compositional
measures of the population age structure and on controls including time
dummies, average and current growth rates of income and income per capita.
Table 1 gives Weil’s results for household saving, for a sample of nine countries
over centred averages. These are compared with my own calculations, based on
the 19 sampled countries illustrated in Figure 4, using centred four-year averages
for the period 1977-92, explicit age and youth dependency ratios, per capita
current growth and average growth, a constant, T -1 time dummies and (in the
fixed-effect model) N -1 country dummies.
In Weil’s study, the proportion of youth has little effect on saving, and the
proportion of working age is positively associated with the savings rate. There is
a unitary negative elasticity of the proportion of elderly in the population on the
savings ratio excluding country dummies, a result replicated in my own
calculations in Column 2 of the table. Including country dummies strengthens





















































from the elderly age-group to the working age-group will reduce household
saving by between 1.3 per cent and 1.8 per cent (depending on whether fixed
country effects are included). The Column 2 result concerning the impact of the
aged dependency ratio is, if anything, stronger than Weil’s once fixed effects are
included, although not quite as robust in terms of standard error. In Column 2,
the youth dependency ratio is positively but weakly associated with the savings
rate, perhaps reflecting higher permanent income expectations or anticipated
bequests.
The other variables merit passing attention. In theory, average growth per
capita over the whole time period is positively related to the savings rate only ifAgeing and Saving
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the age profile of the wealth-income ratio is assumed independent of the growth
rate of the economy (see Modigliani (1986)). An impact of the current growth
rate could be compatible with the impact of transitory income on savings, but the
effect is not significant. An impact of the level of per capita income on the
savings rate is not compatible with the LCH, at least in its simplest variant. Time
dummies are significant, and it will be noted that the inclusion of country fixed
effects improves the explanatory power of the equation fourfold.
12
Orthodox economic theory would imply an even stronger relationship
between the aged dependency ratio and the level of investment (fixed capital
formation) in an economy. In the neo-classical growth model in a closed
economy (Solow, 1956), lower saving directly implies lower investment, and
indeed such a relationship would be predicted in a National Accounts
framework, if the government sector is in balance. Within the LCH, the
dissaving of the elderly involves a reduction in the value of their capital —
whether as a reduction in the physical stock or as a reduction in the equity value
which would appear as a reduced rate of capital formation. In an open economy,
with international capital flows, capital will tend to flow to the country with the
highest rate of return, and again an economy with an ageing population is
unlikely to see buoyant investment, other things being equal. And, again, a
negative statistical cross-country relationship can be confirmed from the data
(Disney, 1996).
In passing, we can also look at the relationship between growth of output
(GDP — gross domestic product) and ADR. Again in the neo-classical model of
economic growth, the long-run rate of growth of an economy is independent of
its savings rate and depends positively on the rates of growth of the labour force
and of labour-force productivity. Thus, if an ageing population implies slower
labour-force growth and slower productivity growth (there is little evidence of
the latter relationship, however), GDP growth should also be lower. Out of
equilibrium, savings rates may affect GDP growth by affecting the capital-labour
ratio — indeed, in the absence of lower saving, slower population growth might
imply too much saving and an economy characterised by ‘dynamic inefficiency’.
This raises the fundamental issue of whether it matters, for social welfare, that
an ageing population implies lower saving, a deceleration of investment growth
and lower GDP growth. In any event, we can pursue the same extrapolative
exercise from the observed negative relationship between GDP growth and the
ADR across OECD countries for 1977-92, illustrated in Figure 5, and the results
for the extrapolation to the year 2025 in Figure 6 again suggest slower growth
across all the OECD countries, with much greater bunching of the countries
                                                                                                                                   
12 Relative to the US, and for the period 1977-92, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark and Greece had significantly higher household savings rates, and Finland and Holland significantly




GDP Growth and Aged Dependency Ration: 24 OECD Countries, 1977-92
FIGURE 6
















































































































around a lower growth rate — Japan ‘joining the bunch’ from previously being
an outstanding performer, and the UK, by virtue of the slower rise in its ADR,
appearing to be an above-average performer.
So, overall, there is confirmation that ageing populations are associated with
variations in macroeconomic performance across OECD countries, as theory
would suggest. Countries that did particularly `well’ in the period 1977-92 (that
is, had higher saving and investment, and faster growth) regress towards the
average by 2025. The UK, in contrast, does rather better than the average in
2025 compared with its rather mediocre performance in the 1977-92 period. It
should, however, be emphasised again that the extrapolations are based on some
strong assumptions and a rather simplistic model. Furthermore, GDP growth,
savings rates and investment growth are all commonly-cited measures of
economic performance but they are not measures of social welfare: economic
theory would predict that just such relationships should appear in the data and
might be consistent with optimal behaviour, given differences in aged
dependency ratios across countries and changes over time.
IV. MICROECONOMIC EVIDENCE ON SAVING
None of these macroeconomic trends necessarily implies that the future living
standards of today’s elderly, or indeed of people in later middle age, need
decline. However, prospects for more youthful generations look less
encouraging. First, social security programmes are being cut back and future
state pensions are likely to be less generous. Second, the question arises of
whether the occupational pension sector will survive in its present form. The
‘traditional’ occupational pension scheme in Britain bases pension benefits on
final salary. It can be shown that such a practice disproportionately benefits
older, longer-tenured workers.
13 The economic argument for `wage tilt’ towards
older workers, and the provision of final salary pensions, is as an incentive
device designed to make younger workers work harder and remain with the
company (Ippolito, 1994). However, in the UK, there are now more older
workers and retirement pensioners in occupational pension plans, and fewer
younger workers. Furthermore, membership of occupational pension schemes is
voluntary, and many young workers have opted not to join their company
pension plan, either purchasing a personal pension or opting to rejoin the State
Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS).
14 It is not apparent that this
situation can be sustained in the context of a continued ageing of the population
and growth of the number of retirement pensioners, as attempts to finance
                                                                                                                                   
13 This is known as ‘backloading’ of pension accruals, i.e. accrual of pension rights is not proportionate to the
amount put in each year in a final salary plan. See, inter alia, Bodie, Macus and Merton (1988), Ippolito (1985)
and Disney and Whitehouse (1996).
14 See Disney and Stears (1996).Fiscal Studies
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continued generous levels of benefits to long-tenured members (and generous
early retirement provisions as a means of cheaply ‘downsizing’ companies and
institutions) may induce exiting behaviour from pension schemes by younger
participants. So ageing work-forces may also lead companies to reconsider the
nature of their pension schemes.
There is, however, another issue, on which I concentrate in this section. Does
the microeconomic evidence of individual behaviour, from individual datasets
rather than cross-country aggregate comparisons, square with the broad
macroeconomic predictions of the previous analysis? For example, do the time
paths of individual wealth holdings imitate the stylised time path in Figure 2? Do
people smooth consumption across income variations over time, as suggested by
the theory? And do elderly people run down their assets to close to zero? To the
extent that individual behaviour is inconsistent with the stylised model, the
macroeconomic predictions may fail to materialise.
Studies of individuals across a variety of countries and datasets have
suggested a number of findings. First, people do not completely ‘smooth’ their
consumption between working periods and retirement, where there appears to be
a dip in consumption expenditure, even allowing for reductions in expenditure
on goods that are complementary to work (such as travel and work clothing).
15
Second, people do not completely annuitise their wealth at retirement: they
engage in precautionary saving and in accruing wealth that is potentially
bequeathable, such as housing and financial assets. Indeed, some people exhibit
behaviour consistent with the idea that they would prefer less of their wealth to
be tied up in the form of saving for retirement (primarily pension wealth) and
more in the form of bequeathable assets (Bernheim, 1991).
Third, people continue to be net savers long into their retirement period. This
seems particularly prevalent in Japan (Ando, Moro, Cordoba and Garlando,
1995). This suggests either a strong bequest motive, or a strong insurance motive
— people hold onto assets late into life in case of unanticipated expenditures
and, particularly, the possibility of expensive nursing or medical care. There is
evidence that housing assets in particular perform this role: elderly people are
reluctant to leave the ‘family house’, even if it is expensive to maintain, since
they see it both as a potential bequest and as a means of retaining attention from
children by visits etc.
16 In addition to serving as a potential bequeathable asset,
housing functions as an insurance asset which could be sold if expensive health
care is required late in life (Skinner, 1991).
17 (This is why the prospect of selling
the family home in retirement to finance expenditure in retirement has proved
such a political ‘hot potato’ to the government in Britain in recent months.)
                                                                                                                                   
15 See Banks, Blundell and Tanner (1995).
16 This is related to the so-called ‘strategic bequest’ motive: see Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985).
17 In any event, the annuity value of a house sale is fairly small, at least until a person is into their mid-
seventies. See Skinner (1993).Ageing and Saving
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Some evidence that elderly people continue to hold assets in the form of
housing in Britain, while being prepared to run down other assets, is obtained by
Disney, Gallagher and Henley (1995) using data from the 1988-89 Retirement
Survey. Table 2 shows that owner-occupiers tend to maintain the value of their
housing stock well into their seventies, while allowing their stock of financial
assets to decline. Interestingly, renters, who are on average considerably poorer,
seem to maintain their stock of financial assets longer, presumably again as a
form of precautionary saving. So, many people, on death, will be bequeathing a
house to their surviving relatives, whether the widow / widower or children.
But two puzzles remain to be explained. First, why do people cut their
consumption on retirement? Second, why does the macroeconomic evidence
suggest that countries with aged populations have lower savings rates, while the
microeconomic evidence suggests that people continue to hold assets well into
retirement?
Cutting consumption on retirement may stem from several factors. One is that
people become more `risk-averse’ on retirement — the prospect of unexpected
shocks to income or expenditure is no longer cushioned by the possibility of
working harder and deriving extra income. Second, retirement income may be
less than anticipated, as suggested by Banks, Blundell and Tanner (1995).
Evidence for this is contained in the Retirement Survey dataset for Britain,
where a significant number of pensioners (particularly occupational pensioners)
report themselves ‘disappointed’ ex post with their retirement income. Third,
final retirement from the labour market may take place earlier than people
anticipate: in other words, people have incorrect retirement expectations.
18 The
second question that was posed above concerns the discrepancy between the
macroeconomic (cross-country) evidence that aged populations dissave and the
microeconomic (individual) evidence that older people do not dissave as fast as
Figure 2 would predict. Some writers, such as Weil (1994), have suggested that
we should look more carefully at both actual and potential intergenerational
transfers — notably, at bequests — and he provides one reconciliation of the
evidence. In Weil’s story, the elderly do indeed continue to save, with the
intention of bequeathing to their children. On receipt of the bequest, the children
will, of course, consume more (even though they would continue to be net savers
out of their own income). But the additional ‘twist’ to the story is that potential
recipients of bequests consume their bequest in advance of receiving it — if they
expect to receive the family home in a few years, they may not defer the
purchase of the new car or the new kitchen. Weil’s evidence from the US Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics suggests that families that receive a bequest
increase their consumption by, on average, 10.4 per cent. This is not surprising
                                                                                                                                   
18 Bernheim (1989) fails to confirm this last hypothesis for the US, but it has not as yet been tested on British
data. Current work at the Institute for Fiscal Studies on the 1994-95 reinterview data for the Retirement Survey
may shed some light on this.Fiscal Studies
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but, more intriguingly, families that expect to receive a bequest increase their
consumption by 4.8 per cent. Net saving is lower in countries with higher aged
dependency ratios not because there are more dissavers after retirement, but
because children are spending their inheritances in advance!
Thus there is a more complicated story concerning intergenerational
transactions, heightened by population ageing. Greater uncertainty among the
elderly, and those nearing retirement, may lead them to raise their saving,
especially if they care about succeeding generations. This serves to forestall the
fall in saving predicted by the stylised economic model. But the young anticipate
that the greater saving will give them greater private sector wealth and so
(notwithstanding the prospect of lower pension benefits when they retire) they
proceed to maintain consumption by using actual and potential bequests. Little
wonder that the prospect of paying for long-term health care out of the potential
bequeathable assets (such as the sale of family homes) has created so much
political heat and a demand for some adequate means of ‘protecting’ these
assets.
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued that macroeconomic evidence associates ageing populations with
lower savings rates, slower investment growth and a reduced rate of GDPAgeing and Saving
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growth. These cross-country relationships can be vindicated by more robust
regressions based on panel data. Interpolations of the cross-country relationships
to the year 2025 suggest some interesting changes in macroeconomic
performance and in the relative ranking of OECD countries. Some of these
changes will have implications for individual behaviour.
However, the evidence from individual data (mostly, at present, for the US)
suggests that the life-cycle hypothesis of saving implicit in the cross-country
predictions concerning the effect of ageing populations on saving has
weaknesses, particularly in explaining the saving behaviour of the elderly, who
do not dissave to the extent required by a stylised version of the theory. We need
a better understanding of household savings behaviour and, in particular, of how
intrafamilial and intergenerational transactions motivate behaviour. In an ‘ideal’
setting, the young would be prepared to pay generous social security benefits to
the current old with lower incomes and provide support for long-term health
care. The more affluent current elderly and those nearing retirement age will
bequeath much of their wealth to their children, which will permit those children
to obtain a reasonable standard of living despite the prospective cut-backs in
social security. Of course, consideration of the extended family as an internal
insurance market is an old concept, pre-dating the development of social security
systems and sophisticated financial markets. It would be a paradox if the
challenge of financing ageing populations led to a restoration of an emphasis on
such intrafamilial transactions.
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